Identities: How Governed, Who Pays?
H. B. Paksoy
For the old/new.
02 Uses of Identity
03 Official Identity
04 Leavening of Identity
05 Identity of Governance
06 Commercial Identity
07 Interactions of Identities
08 Corporate Identity
09 Identity of Belief Systems
10 Mosaic Identity
11 Technological and Future Identities
12 Secret Identities
14. About the Author
In a given polity, interactions between the governed and the governing strata are symbiotic. The governed desire, and indeed need, infrastructure services organized. If such basic foundations are not provided, the economic activity so deeply cherished by both groups cannot be realized. The governing strata cannot function without the governed. After all, without the governed, there will not be a polity; hence nothing to govern. Regardless of the politico-economic system in effect, this co-dependence is inevitable, inescapable, indenturing both groups to each other. This is the case, regardless of the designation, functions, or the style of the governance system. It matters not if the designation or philosophy of the said governance is a variation of pluralism or authoritarianism by a minority. Trouble starts when one of the two groups attempts to escape (or, neglect) responsibility; that is, endeavors to break the symbiosis. If the group attempting to shed the previously prescribed responsibilities does so by forcing a change to the governance guidelines established over time, the conflict escalates.
Just as in any other activity on earth with pre-arranged and agreed upon rules, when rules are violated, it is no longer the same game. Much of the governance mechanisms will revert to muscle power solutions and the beneficiary will not be the two main players. Both sides will lose heavily to small parties “in the middle” that will emerge in the form of arbitrators unintended by either.
This middle group will establish new rules that will only suit itself, filling the ensuing vacuum, untouched by any other dogma than self-interest. This third group (in the middle) will ignore the principle of equity and the inherent balance of power. A distinguishing feature of the in-between groups is simply that they will exist between the main players and between law and lawlessness. As nature abhors a vacuum, for every such in-between group, there will be counterbalancing ones opposing it. All will be vying for the top spot to rule over the unintentionally created ‘system’ of checks and balances.
Once established, the in-between groups will immediately begin feeding on both main parties, changing the principle values and those of key personnel. This will create corruption, devoted solely for the purpose of jumping the queue, subverting the essential balance-of-power rules formed over time at great cost to humanity. The objective of the in-between groups is acquiring wealth without competition, and an endless income stream without inventories, production or standard (capital, labor, resource) investment. As more elements from the two primary parties are co-opted into the in-between groups, the legitimate organizations will also become corrupt. The return to the original functions and balance can never be possible afterward – even if the in-between groups are declared extinct. The only defense, therefore, is the prevention of the formation of the in-between groups. Unfortunately, governance strata, especially operating in the international venues, either establish their own in-between groups to circumvent rivals, or provide aid and comfort to those who can.
Hence, the symbiosis is not confined to a single polity or ethnicity. Relations within human gatherings, whether on this earth or on any other celestial body – perhaps on the Moon or Mars in the first instance – will adhere to the human governance templates extant in the early ages of the Earth, including the experiments undertaken to escape those arrangements. For the purpose, there are primarily three main weapons the antagonists can wield against each other when they attempt to divest themselves of the symbiosis. These are: production stoppage; withholding of resources; trespass to the person. When the indicated equilibrium is disturbed by one primary group, the competing group will retaliate in kind, according to the category involved, furthering the disruption of the life-balance. The blowback from such activities will further corrupt the legitimate organization and principles that were formed as a result of thousands of years’ worth of on the ground experience. This is where technology is abused for negative outcomes in the governance dynamics. For example, a helicopter may airlift a human for medical treatment for a healthy life, or death; or medicine may turn the life of another human into hell on earth. It must not be forgotten that those participating in the abuse of the rules will be abused themselves as well. The opposing side will always manage to take revenge. This is the ultimate guarantee that the previously agreed upon rules will be enforced – when this fact is prominently remembered by the observers outside the polity (see H.B. Paksoy, Humans on Mars and Beyond Charleston, 2012).
One method of maintaining balance and peace between the primary groups is to educate them. The more they share common knowledge, the better they will serve the mutual objectives that will be obtained. Any extra greed on either party’s mind must be restrained by this knowledge. The outcome will have to match the input in terms of effort as well as objectives and resources devoted to the enterprise. Therefore, this will be an offering to prevent any flare ups or resultant hellish fires. So, why the recorded bloodshed? Because some “players” have not yet learned the rules?
Throughout history, it is possible to observe continuous contention between the individual and the polity identities. This intra-communal bifurcation manifests itself in all activities of human endeavor, including economic, political and personal versus sovereign states rights. However, never before has the role of technology been elevated to the present level, contesting all comers, to reach absolute supremacy. This contention has not only replaced the levers of control used earlier in dictating elements of rule, but has reached levels of control heretofore unknown. Obviously, technology, without human guidance cannot achieve a result. Left unchecked, any governing strata can utilize the technological means to deny any segment of society the individual rights that have been at least philosophically established (see H.B. Paksoy, “Leviathan: Identity Interactions between Society and Technology,” Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar, 2006: 2, pp. 157-162).
What is presented in the following pages is not a series of artificial rules, nor are they mental peregrinations. Instead, the axioms are constructed from past evidence, results of action-reactions, indicators of continuous struggle between the two groups in their endless search for life’s equitable balance against each other.
Any human can be ambitious. No excess in any direction is justifiable under any excuse. I trust that the thinking public will express their thoughts on the subject matter as a counter-balance to the transgressions of overly ambitious individuals – whatever their titles or stations.
1. This is a skeleton, if you will, to be fleshed out by the specific examples the reader may choose to endow on it.
2. All humans are fallible. My failing is writing this.
3. According to my records, this effort was begun in 1983. In the ensuing years, I filled close to a dozen notebooks on various aspects of identity. For the first sixteen years of this process, the primary idea was to better understand the nature of the subject.
4. While teaching courses on World History and Intercultural Studies in four different universities, the questions of perceptive student on these topics further stimulated the process.
5. What finally persuaded me to organize these notebooks, to the extent presented here, was the realization that most if not all discussions of identity in print have been applied cases.
6. I, too, produced works on applied identity in the past. Some even appeared in print in various countries on three continents.
7. After reading the latest commentaries on applied identity studies, a thought presented itself that a more general discussion might be beneficial to all concerned regardless of discipline, nationality, ethnicity or any other concern.
8. By way of taking the first step, it can be stressed that almost all authors devoting their energies to the topic at hand have concentrated on one polity or the relations of one identity with its neighbors, competitors, or allies.
9. In view of the present project this is positive, for an attempt at universality can hardly be undertaken without access to particulars. It is the existing wealth of the specific cases that will supply the necessary data for testing the universality of the propositions presented here.
10. Efforts expended towards the definition of the universals of a subject to help the understanding of the topic at hand may be rewarding.
11. The process of thought employment takes place with the full cognizance and acquiescence of those who follow the wake of the thought employers. And, with or without the knowledge of the thought employer itself.
12. Not many thought employers, those individuals or institutions whose thought output employ the efforts, and, in many cases, all resources of other individuals or polities, have concentrated their attention on identity. The designer community, on the other hand, has spent quite a proportion of their resources on the issue.
13. The objective here, still, is to better understand the nature and uses of identity; be it the case that identity has natural roots or is a synthetic creation of thought employers.
14. Here, the question: “is there a set of universal principles governing identity?” presents itself.
15. Most identities in existence today have successfully transformed themselves from their origins by means of organization, necessity and diligence. This adaptation or new formation is the result of conscious choices and methods created, borrowed, or adapted for the purpose.
16. Not all identities traveled through the same journey to reach their present positions.
17. Yet, when examined, one can detect a wide variety of principles or actions that constitute at the least a common denominator.
18. An understanding of these commonalities, or the efforts leading to that objective, will help all in the direction of a more stable common base, shorn of emotion and without special pleading.
19. A word on the structure: Each paragraph is meant to be a beginning point for discussion on that particular proposition.
20. Perhaps the paragraph type of presentation may also clarify the steps involved in the process, allowing the construction of the larger vista by applicable additions. The method dates back in history and was used by scores of individual thought employers, including Marcus Aurelius, Balasagunlu Yusuf and Wittgenstein.
21. It is customarily difficult to get a work of this nature into print in the lifetime of the author, unless the topic and contents are already well known. This is so because the publishers have grown accustomed to sending proposed projects to outside erudite evaluators. If these readers are not familiar with the subject, contents, and are not working with the topic, the recommendation process slows considerably.
22. These difficulties are compounded if the contents of the project fall within an overlapping area inhabited by several well defined disciplines.
23. When sponsors are found with an interest in the work, this difficulty, to a large measure, is overcome.
1. Fans of professional athletic clubs tend to cluster together. In a particular case in the U.S., supporters of a specific baseball team collectively identify themselves as “the Tribe.” They variously revel in and commiserate with the varying fortunes of their chosen stars. The individuals in this group state that they identify with all the elements of their adopted assembly, including symbols (flags, team colors, uniform, songs, chants of encouragement, jersey numbers of most valuable players). Their relationship with this grouping becomes a part of “who” and “what” they are. That is, in addition to what else they might be: parent, offspring, sibling, taxpayer, citizen of a given state, profession or political affiliation. This, despite the fact that each individual considering himself a full-fledged member of this “tribe” may hold values and opinions that may, in all possibility, clash with other members once all concerned are away from the stadium.
2. During the earlier part of the twentieth century, it was suggested in the popular press that what transpires on a playing field, when two professional teams meet, is but a representation of real war. This was especially applied to American football.
3. Thus, one is reminded, inter alia, of the single combats of early history, in which one individual from each of two opposing groups of people fought to settle their differences. The winning warrior would determine the fate of the losing side. This was also applied to two opposing teams in South America, in the case of the Maya rubber-ball game. (One is also reminded of the “Soccer War” that took place during the 1970s in South America). In all those cases, more than the simple score of a game was involved. The outcome was a matter of (literally) life and death. Hence the emotional attachment of spectator-fans to their team and the final result.
4. Could this have been the attachment at the root of the phenomenon later termed “nationalism?” Which comes first: the identity or the allegiance?
5. It can be argued that a winning team draws adherents, supporters, fans. But, there must have been a kernel of an identity among the originating mass for a “team” to have been formed in the first place.
6. In the depths of time, the formation of an armed party could have been necessary for the group/mass to survive the attacks of neighbors. Upon succeeding in repulsing armed visits from the surrounding “other,” they might have decided to return the visit. Or, simply chose to explore their own limitations. Kingdoms are thus formed, occasionally expanding into empires when the conditions are ripe. And all of these necessarily or naturally clash with each other, since they all followed similar patterns of expansion.
7. In the course of applying “military” power, the commander or the command structure may feel the need to engage in a bit of thinking. The opposition may have similar forces, not only in numbers and ability, but also in weaponry and intentions. Resort to “stratagems” might be called for if the “team” is to carry the day.
8. After conquering a near or far neighbor, the team will encounter the issues of governing an alien body of people. These new subjects might speak a different tongue, eat unknown foods, possess belief systems never before encountered. If the victorious team’s intention is simple loot, they will take their booty and return to their native soil. But, if they decide to stay in the new land (they may like the climate, seaside, food or simply the general environment), they must cope with the newly encountered conditions. For example, Babur, in his memoirs, complained that the climate – especially the humidity – of India had a detrimental effect on his army’s recurved bows.
9. The first decision confronting the team is whether to assimilate into the people they have conquered, or be assimilated by them.
10. This is not always a conscious decision, although frequently decided in full cognizance.
11. But what determines the outcome? Not necessarily a further test of physical prowess, although that may take place down the road, given developments based on all the other factors combined. These factors are mostly interactive, and involves relations, in their totality, with the conquered people.
12. What determines the behavior and response of the conquered party that has lost its independence and freedom? Do they want it back, or are they content to be assimilated? Do they have the means to rebel and physically challenge their conquerors, or have they suffered large casualties and so must wait a generation or two?
13. Possibly the invading team has, at least in the immediate period, overwhelming power. Will it always be so?
14. What sustains the losing party while they are biding their time for an uprising that will free them? Mind you, this waiting period can be rather extended; lasting in some cases several centuries.
15. Is it the yearning for days past, days of independence (self-determination), which keeps the former ways and thoughts alive? Memories re-articulated time and again through various media (songs, literature – written or oral – physical expressions in art, practices of belief systems).
16. With the re-manifestation of established practices, a distinct combination of preferences begins to form a distinct set of visions of life for the future.
17. Some losing teams begin to appeal to the authority and comfort of the supernatural if they have no concrete established practices of their own, or if their belief system had encouraged such.
18. A sub-group within the losing party may appeal to their own belief system for redemption. They may derive temporary comfort from the practice, but not necessarily relief. Unless, that is, somehow the efforts expended to seek comfort are translated into action to procure independence; to pursue the actual goal.
19. When used to bolster the pursuit of a goal, such as recapturing independence, the nature and structure of the belief systems has a direct influence on the ensuing events.
20. Is the belief system native to the party practicing it? That is, was it created by that society? Or, was it borrowed or adopted from another?
21. Does the belief system respond to demands made of it, in the minds of its adherents, to all contingencies, or only to a portion thereof?
22. The “response” of the belief system to the emotional and spiritual needs of practitioners need to be flexible. Otherwise, a new system might replace the old.
23. If the belief system was created by outsiders before importation into a society, it is almost certain that the liturgy and doctrine will have lost some of its original aesthetics and meaning.
24. Imported ecumenical rites and liturgy will carry the values of another society, the one that originally created it. Those imported values are likely to be contradictory to the practices and beliefs of the importers. Even if the clash is not immediately outwardly visible or discernible, it will result in dissatisfaction among the adherents when the spiritual solace is sought but proves elusive.
25. What causes a party to import a belief system? Because they themselves could not create one? Or the one in use at the time of importation proved more useful? Or, was the imported one imposed by force of arms?
26. At times, the imported belief system has allure because it may “respond” to the immediate needs by providing the backdrop or justification for extant practices. This is especially important when the belief system in use had brought too many obligations or impediments to the enjoyment of life.
27. The “excitement” enjoyed while learning a new “secret” may contribute to the importation and acceptance of a new belief system.
28. Belief systems also tend to flow from the conquered to the conquerors. It is almost invariably an act of conquest from within. The conquerors become the vanquished when they begin to lose their own belief systems. This will aid in the assimilation of the conquering party into the vanquished. It may take place within one-to-three generations.
29. The leadership of the conquering party will become aware of this shift, but they may not be in a strong enough position to prevent the changeover. This may be a result of their genuine desire to maintain amicable relations with the conquered; or the fact that the vanquished are much more numerous.
30. A portion of the conquering leadership may wish to preserve their “old” ways, value systems, preferring to press the vanquished to accept that position. Another portion of the conquerors are likely to side with the subjects. This will cause a bifurcation within the leadership of the rulers.
31. The vanquished will reflect the bifurcation appearing among the ranks of their conquerors; one group eager to accept the value systems of their conquerors, another opting for their own as it existed prior to their conquest.
32. The bifurcation among the vanquished may be caused by a desire to garner economic gain. The difference is due to the pathways chosen. The question both sides may be asking is: which way is more beneficial?
33. There is a choice made by the vanquished. Those adopting the value systems of their conquerors probably believe that the winning ways (such as their conquerors’) will prevail.
34. Those rejecting the value systems of the conqueror are clinging to their own ways, wishing to gain ascendancy by purifying their own leavening and themselves in any manner possible.
35. It has also been observed that while the conquerors managed to impose their own policies on the vanquished, the belief systems of the vanquished conquered the conqueror.
36. Transformation of societies can take place within a single generation; or they may be successfully opposed over several centuries. The will of a given society facing these circumstances determines the outcome.
37. If a polity decides, or is reasonably guided, it can and will effect an economic transformation in a matter of decades.
38. Political and belief system transformations usually take much longer. Even if the pressure exerted from external sources is overwhelming.
39. There is a price to pay for any type of transformation The faster the change, the greater the bill.
40. The motives of those endeavoring to transform a society need to be understood by those whose lives are going to be effected.
41. The style and operational mode of those seeking to transform a society is also a matter to carefully consider. There are going to be great differences between dictators, reformers (of the muckraker style, or other variants), and altruistic individuals.
42. Faster economic transformations will cost more in value systems; that is, in loss of traditional values.
43. If the economic transformation is successful in one generation, then the grandparents may be able to pass on their own values to the grandchildren, at least to a certain extent, effectively braking the total loss.
44. The grandchildren may not always appreciate the value of the traditional value system, especially during their adolescence. This has to do with what the grandchildren perceive to be preferable values around them.
45. The “old order” (sometimes manifested by the older generation) usually thinks that the values of their society are being downgraded. They may not always be thinking in that direction erroneously. The environmental damage might be telling.
46. After the “reform” movement begins, the “new values” will be hailed as “winning” by the side that advocate them. This could be a justification of current behavior by the leadership.
47. Eventually, some of the “old” values will seem to be desirable once again; in a reduced or “watered down” manner, in a semblance of a pendulum effect.
48. In many instances, “reform” is nothing but a return to common sense and the re-discovery of actual facts. Wyclif seems to have detected this effect.
49. Truth is fragile, even if it can be found in its absolute state. Truth is colorless, odorless and hence rather easy to overlook. It does no harm in itself, nor does it threaten to. Therein lies a reason for its fragility. Truth can be polluted exceedingly easily, almost effortlessly. Just an addition of color, a whiff of fragrance will accomplish the erosion. Who, after all, can detect the downgrading, but those who are acquainted with truth in its absolute state.
50. If truth is so very transparent, how does one become adept at recognizing its essence through the heavy foliage engulfing it?
51. The art of tainting the truth can be called propaganda, or, employing a new euphemism, public relations. It is not too difficult to hide the truth under a heap of semantics and lexicon. Any such effort must be investigated to the bone.
52. Truth and identity share many attributes. Today, there are a number of polities whose undocumented lore state that as an “ethnogenesis” they have been in continuous existence for ten thousand years or more. Some in those polities fervently believe in that lore. To them, it is the “truth.” To those who seek material evidence, it is myth. The reconciliation of the two may never be possible.
53. Identities are self-leavening. They are passed on from one generation to the next.
54. As the leavened identities are passed on, they are either developed further, or impurities (with respect to origins) are introduced into them.
55. In most cases, identity is equal to culture.
56. It has been claimed that contacts between cultures yield a fusion, resulting in a new culture.
57. The term culture in use today generally is derived from the Roman use. It was first applied to agriculture, as in cultivating the fields. By extension, it came to mean development of faculties, mind.
58. Cheese and wine have their own, specific cultures. If wine culture (instead of cheese) is introduced into the cheese cauldron at the time of the formation (leavening), the resulting entity can neither be eaten nor drunk. At least, not with the pleasure that accompanies the original entity. (This does not refer to a specific port cheese; where the wine is added after the cheese is leavened, for flavoring purposes.)
59. Cheese and wine can be ingested by humans simultaneously. This is because their tastes complement each other so well, and not because their leavening agents have been exchanged at the time of their formations.
60. Both the wine and the cheese cultures, the essential leavening agents, may be purified or developed further. That is why there are so many hundreds of cheese varieties; not to mention the styles and types of wines.
61. Like others (e.g. beer, yoghurt, bread), the origins of cheese and wine cultures are not known today; at least, it is not discoverable with the aid of present technology. The origins of human cultures have a similar mist enveloping them.
62. Whatever their origins, human cultures can also be developed, made more distinct. They may even be transformed. Whether this is beneficial or detrimental depends on their relations with others and the discernible outcomes.
63. The relations among cultures has always formed civilizations. Some civilizations are extinct, others continue to flourish.
64. The term civilization also entered into usage from Roman precedent. Originally it pertained to the citizens, their private rights, hence relating to the body of citizens or the commonwealth, and as distinct from the soldiery, proper public or social order under rule of law, human society.
65. It is difficult to speak of a particular civilization before considering individual cultures contributing to that civilization.
66. A given community will have a specific identity. That identity will encompass individuals living within it. As each individual constituting that community has an identity, the community identity will become a mosaic of its components.
67. The community mosaic identity is quite different from the mosaic identity born of duress.
1. It is not unusual for the governance strata of a polity to attempt at forming an official, uniform identity. In fact, it is usually the norm.
2. Some attempts to create an official identity even succeed.
3. The elements of official identity generally start with the origin myth. This myth may be fortified to a certain extent with scholarly apparatus.
4. Belief systems are invariably injected into the official identity. If the belief system is indigenous to the new official identity it is kept and underlined with appropriate fanfare.
5. If the belief system is of an imported nature, then it may be modified.
6. The modifications to an imported belief system will emphasize the specific contributions of the importers. It will also be internalized, and made unique to the new owners as much as possible.
7. The sub-groups existing within the polity may wish to retain their old identity, resisting the new official identity. This will create conflicts, and even migrations.
8. The governance strata will induce the population to accept the new official identity. These inducements will take many forms.
9. If the inducements do not produce satisfactory results, compulsion will be applied.
10. New institutions will be formed, to bolster the existing institutions in spreading the new official identity.
11. The success of the new identity will depend on several key elements. The most important is how well the elements resonate with what is already accepted by the members of the polity.
12. The natural receptiveness of the population to the new modifications may depend on emotions or economic benefits that may accrue by accepting the new position.
13. Not everyone in the polity will accept the new official identity as it is presented by the governance strata. This is because there will be regional and sub-regional identities already in existence. The official version may not adequately reflect these subtle differences to the satisfaction of regional polities.
14. At times, readily identifiable elements from one regional identity may dominate the officially constructed identity. This will displease the other regional polities. Existence of this condition may even cause rejection of the entire construct.
15. Generally, during the course of disseminating the newly constructed official identity, any attempt at modification will cause not only confusion but also rejection.
16. One of the preferred dissemination methods used by the governance strata is the creation of folklore. Academic attention to folklore will legitimize the contents thereof.
17. The ‘general educational system’ of the polity, be it based on traditions or formalized, will also have to be redesigned to accommodate the new identity; especially beginning with the lowest level institutions.
18. It is imperative to the governance strata that future generations are raised inculcated with the new identity. Failure on this score will jeopardize the project from its inception. For this purpose, the governance strata will devote significant resources to the indoctrination of school children.
19. Annual commemorative days will be named after significant events or persons. Ceremonies created or resuscitated for the purpose will take on the importance of mass festivals.
20. Personages and events will also be named as examples of failure or repulsion, usually without commemorative days. This is another effort to create cohesion, to draw attention to what actions and thoughts must be avoided.
21. One reason for a governing stratum to create an official identity is a desire to create cohesion in that polity.
22. Without unified common goals, a polity will not survive intact.
23. Polities compete with each other, in all possible endeavors of life.
24. Polities that cannot adapt to the natural transformation that takes place over time in the affairs of human endeavor will perish; they will cease to exist as a polity, community or collection of individuals.
25. The path of humans to the present is littered with examples of collapsed empires, extinct polities and disappearing leavening agents.
26. Not every sub-group in every extinct polity vanishes in their entirety. Some of these sub-groups manage to re-create themselves. This they achieve by means of re-constructing their identity, either by natural means or through the efforts of their governing strata in building an official identity.
27. Colonialism is a case where independent polities are brought under the rule of a colonizing power, usually by means of armed force.
28. No empire lives forever. After the life-force Identity of an empire is degraded, the empire will collapse.
29. Not all polities engulfed earlier by an empire will survive the collapse of that empire.
30. As an empire disintegrates, a portion of the constituent polities will re-assert their former identities.
31. The difference between those polities who can re-assert themselves after the empire in which they were placed by force is dissolved and those who cannot is found in the strength of their leavening processes.
32. Each polity already has a natural identity from its origin.
33. The commonly shared values of the mass of a polity determines that natural identity.
34. The natural identity of a polity will be modified by the specific actions of its owners. This will take place over prolonged periods of time.
35. Whether or not this natural identity is refined (as in high culture) or returns to more rough forms (initial formation stages) is decided by the owners. Consciously or otherwise.
36. If the owners are proud of their identity, they will take concrete steps to propagate or even embellish it.
37. The propagation of a polity’s identity starts with inculcating the young of the polity.
38. The process of inculcating the young of a polity involves formulating the leavening process.
39. The leavening process includes the commonly shared values, as expressed in various activities of life, such as origin myths, music, literature, art, military prowess, agricultural practices, belief systems and so on. All these aspects form the bases of identity.
40. Some polities may be so unhappy with their existing identity that they will resolve to forget it altogether and adopt another. This happened in several documented cases in Asia and the Pacific region.
41. A polity may decide that they do not like their identity because they are unhappy with their predicament. They may have lost their livelihood, independence or influence. This also indicates that they either did not have a strong identity to begin with, or that the leavening process of that identity was not sufficiently developed.
42. The changes in a polity’s identity may be conscious or haphazard.
43. In polities where haphazard changes (without documented foundations) take place in the identity, the said identity does not survive.
44. When the polity is proud of its identity, it will strive to make it known widely.
45. A polity’s excessive pride in its own identity will lead to false pride as well.
46. The excessively defined identity may seduce the members of that polity to think of themselves in terms of superiority with respect to other identities and polities.
47. The resulting false pride will in the end manifest itself in physical forms in terms of excluding others from their own domain.
48. The false pride becomes even more dangerous to the polity creating it, and to other polities, when veiled forms of it are used.
49. Veiled false pride involves the use of coded words, phrases and sentences to express itself. These are employed to remind the creators of the false pride that they are superior to all others.
50. Another manifestation of false pride is the use of open references to put others – “inferior beings” – in their place.
51. The open references used by the creators of false pride, and the resulting actions, will offend other polities, especially those termed inferior.
52. Any polity holding itself to be offended or humiliated will retaliate with any means available. The offended party will regard this a matter of survival.
53. Every natural identity will evolve.
54. The evolution of an identity may benefit or harm the larger community.
55. Neighboring or other interested polities may realize that the identity of a given polity is open to outside influences.
56. It is rare that a polity will refrain from influencing the identity of a neighbor.
57. The polity who attempts to change or influence the identity of another will undertake this task in a stealthy manner.
58. First, the value systems of the target identity will come under pressure.
59. Value systems are the measure by which all other activities are fathomed by the members of that polity.
60. The general objective of the polity attempting to change the identity of a neighbor is to make the neighbor more pliable to the wishes of the polity attempting it.
61. The target polity may realize this and take countermeasures.
62. These countermeasures will range from asserting the existing identity, at first to expand and elaborate it.
63. The reaction of the target polity may be vehement and lead to extreme forms of reassertion.
64. The ensuing fortified regenerated identity may become difficult to contain within the original borders of that polity.
65. Irredentist identity, as a sub branch of a particular identity, may also develop as one result.
66. Polities may have become divided, usually due to war, and one or several sub-groupings fall under the rule of neighboring polities. These sub-groupings will be susceptible to irredentism.
67. If the natural identity of the polity divided against its own wishes possesses sufficient staying power, the irredentist identity activities will have a discernible effect on its own diaspora, the sub-groups that are detached from the main polity.
68. The interaction between the reasserted identity under attack from a neighbor and the resulting irredentist identity will result in an expansionist identity.
1. Each polity will have in its collective memory a sense of its origins.
2. The origin myth is written down centuries later. During this recording process, the ‘contents’ may be altered to suit the tastes of the governance strata.
3. When the decision is made to construct an official identity, one of the first acts will be the resuscitation of the origin myth; generally, with modifications.
4. In some polities, an origin myth is not found despite diligent search. In place of such a myth, a person of the past is created, with no documentation available, to act out the “new” origin myth as if he was a real person.
5. Sometimes, the purpose of creating a “new” myth is to escape the stigma attached to the term “myth,” yet nevertheless announce the exalted qualities to be followed.
6. The message of the origins myth will be presented to the literati and the thought employers. In fact, some of the thought employers actively participate in the process of creation and management of the new identity.
7. The message to the literati and the thought employers: create works using this model and attributes for the people to follow in their new identity.
8. The reward for the thought employers and literati is the dissemination of their works; hence, fame.
9. To accomplish the official task, authors and would be writers strive to overcome a number of natural barriers. Oftentimes, they will have to reject the received wisdom and evidence in order to create afresh elements for the identity to be constructed.
10. Not every attempt at creating a new identity succeeds.
11. Some efforts at creating an identity fail because the desired official identity is too far removed from the existing base elements.
12. Failure at creating a new identity is assured if the old identity already existed in documentation or arts.
13. In the endeavor to create a new identity, the constructors will also build or at least encourage a personality cult.
14. Not every person who eventually becomes a cult in his lifetime has begun to construct his “living deity” status. Frequently, an inner circle (designer community) engineers the process with the expectation of benefitting by association. Not many living deities have been intellectually mature enough to resist the charms of living beatification. They are commonly referenced as ‘dictators’ or ‘charismatics.’
15. Initially, when altruistically motivated, the “living deity” leader category may have been started to unify an otherwise contentious and seriously fragmented population around an admired person or a strongman.
16. When the motive is not altruistic, the results are invariably disastrous. The inner circle of the nominal cult-personality will exaggerate the need to have such a sect, and will abuse the powers it brings.
17. Personality cults may be constructed in every conceivable type of polity. They are much more destructive in polities where the general level of education is relatively low. Education level here is certainly not defined in terms of the proportion of the population holding a diploma or diplomas of any kind.
18. The personality cult constructors will also attempt to construct leavening institutions, rites and methods in imitation of natural leavening process of a given culture.
19. Unlike the natural leavening process, the personality cult agents will, for the duration of the personality cult, escape the consequences of their actions.
20. Natural identity evolves both by individual and external perceptions.
21. In either case, the evolution of natural identity is directed by the desire to access a larger share of existing wealth.
22. When the wealth is limited, the method of access will turn inward and become restrictions to access so as to preserve the privileges of those having first call on available resources.
23. In polities where the state owns the resources and property, the restrictions will take the form of the state disallowing uniform access to resources by all members of the identity.
24. Members of the governance strata, through established institutions, will allow themselves to have the first call on all resources under the argument that the identity must survive before the component individuals of the identity.
1. Selection of a governance system accompanies the identity creation.
2. The new governance system may have been one that was modified from an existing one, with significant changes.
3. The new governance system may also be borrowed in its entirety from another polity.
4. Occasionally, an attempt is made to synthesize a new governance system. This is done by taking parts from several different systems, extant or extinct.
5. Every so often, a new system is designed anew by a polity. That new system becomes a new marker in the general spectrum of political systems.
6. Success of the new governance system will depend on its acceptance by the polity.
7. To ensure the successes of the new governance system, the designer community (which works for the governance strata; may even include their kin and kith in their ranks), working in conjunction with the governance strata, will have to embark upon a “selling” campaign.
8. The designer community of the new governance system will also concern themselves with the methods of preserving it.
9. Hence, there will emerge a system of inducements and compulsion, to have the new governance system take root.
10. Individuals constituting a polity will harbor personal preferences as part of their identity.
11. Preferences of individuals within a polity may be self-defined or influenced or planted in their minds by others.
12. Individuals of similar and shared goals, to varying degrees, will form sub-groups or parties in order to preserve or advance those goals.
13. Sub-groupings are formed within a polity, regardless of the prevailing governance system.
14. The formal designation of such sub-groupings need not be political parties.
15. Various governance participation units will be formed by polity members to reap the benefits that accrue from such association.
16. When the governance system of a polity does not allow real participation in the governance of the polity by individuals, opposition sub-groups will emerge.
17. Opposition groups within a polity that does not allow open participation in the governance of the polity will take distinct forms, either underground or camouflaged within existing institutional cover.
18. Those individuals associating for the purpose of forming a governance participation unit may also belong to other organizations within the same polity.
19. Each of these organizations may be at first be construed as an underground opposition group operating within an established formal institution.
20. Such an organization may be quickly discovered within a tightly controlled polity.
21. Upon discovery of the underground organization, the fortunes of its members will depend on the attitude of the leadership of the formally existing institution.
22. If the leadership of the formally existing institution providing unwitting cover for the undercover organization is unhappy with the policies of the governance system of the polity, they may decide to co-opt the underground organization.
23. At that point, the involved formally existing institution and the larger polity will begin to redefine a new set of identities.
24. A polity will possess a set of founding rules called laws, constituting the bases of its governance, outlining its self-defined identity.
25. In most cases, the founding rules of a polity will be written, though not all present-day constitutions are.
26. Not all polities constitute their founding rules with an eye to establishing and maintaining checks and balances among the institutions specified therein for the governance of the polity.
27. The lack of clear checks and balances in a set of founding rules does not prevent such relationships from developing.
28. Extant formal organizations within the polity will vie for primacy.
29. The competition for primacy among extant formal organizations emerges from self-interest, to preserve their identities, or to prevent others from attempting to change the said identity.
30. The competition for primacy will take various forms. In the end, to preserve themselves and their identities, all organizations will need variegated resources.
31. Extant governance systems will not allow the formation of new official sub-groupings within their polities, even if they are expressly constituted to participate in the governance of that polity, as components of the ruling governance system.
32. The extant formal organizations are exempt from any ban on the formation of new sub-groupings or governance participation units should they decide to change camps within the formal governance system’s internal balance of power formula and represent accepted wings or ‘parties.’
33. The prevailing bans on the formation of new governance participation units within a polity will help the extant formal organizations in their quest to remain autonomous.
34. The existence of a written constitution does not guarantee that its tenets will be observed, or applied uniformly, or applied at all.
35. Governance participation units will be found in every institution and polity, whether or not they are permitted by the governing strata.
36. Governance participation units do not stop at the borders of a polity.
37. Governance participation units of diverse polities may decide to cooperate across borders.
38. Cross border cooperation of governance participation units aims at reaching their general goal.
39. Cooperation across the borders of polities is not confined to governance participation units.
40. More significantly, thought employers will engage in exchange of ideas across borders of polities.
41. New ideas will enter into the vocabulary of the polity members at large.
42. Use of new vocabulary, whether borrowed from another language or not, will involve the expectations associated with and instigated by new ideas.
43. If a polity has a policy of closed or tightly controlled borders, it will experience significant difficulties in preventing ideas from entering the polity. If at all.
44. Identities develop to recognizable levels due to contact of one polity with others; usually neighbors or trading partners.
45. It is the thought employers who will engage in the accelerated development of the natural identity.
46. Consciously thinking strata consist of thought employers; not those individuals or collectives who have to engage their brains for daily functions, but whose thoughts employ the resources of others.
47. The greater portion of the mass within a polity will not think of the identity of the polity on a daily basis. Unless, the polity is at war, or under similarly drastic conditions when the identity is in immediate danger.
48. Thought employers will concern themselves, continuously, with the matters pertaining to identity.
49. Thought employers are not always members of the governing strata of a polity.
50. The governing strata of a polity will always be very interested in identity.
51. The governing strata of a polity will work on their own agenda items. However, it is necessary for them to maintain and develop their polity’s identity, regardless of all other considerations.
52. In order to maintain and ensure the survival of a polity, it is necessary to answer the question “what are you?”
53. The answer to the question “who are you?” will reveal multiple identities such as parent, sibling, member of a regional location, or of a profession.
54. The answer to the question “what are you?” – whether directed at an individual or polity – will require the member of the polity to think beyond, and to reach down to the basic elements that hold that polity together.
55. If the answer to the question “what are you?” does not easily roll off the tongues of the members of a polity, there are inherent structural difficulties present.
56. Identity and culture will be intertwined. This does not mean they are clearly interchangeable. The change in one will affect the other, which in return, will influence the total outcome.
57. Language is one of the primary elements of identity.
58. Literature developed in a given language is but one aspect of that language; not only does the language constitute a significant portion of the identity of the polity using that language, but it is also a measure of the polity’s identity.
59. It must not be forgotten that the identity of a polity may be maintained to a large degree in another language as well; provided all other elements of identity have sufficiently deep roots. There are significant examples of this phenomenon.
60. Vocabulary of a language is another index by which to measure the nature of the identity of the polity using that language.
61. Borrowed words, from other languages, is another indicator of the degree which that language and culture is in contact with others.
62. Borrowed vocabulary is also a gauge of the strength and originality of the concerned identity and its related culture.
63. During official identity construction, efforts will be exerted to purify the language from foreign elements, by purging the borrowed words.
64. New terms and vocabulary will be constructed during the officially inspired purification process of a given language, either from earlier forms of the same language, or through neologisms by extending the usages of present words.
65. Identity is a two-way street. How a polity regards itself and how others accept (or reject) the identity of that polity is the traffic that flows along that thoroughfare.
66. Other polities might reject the identity of a given polity on the basis that the emerging or reasserted identity will be seen as a disruption of the existing world order.
67. The objectors will contend that demand on already scarce resources would cause a disruption in the supply conditions.
68. The existing alliances within the governance strata of a polity will be forced to reckon with the new balance of power equations developing among a series of relationships as a result of the emergence (or, re-emergence) of a new identity developing in their midst.
69. New identities within balance of power struggles and formulas tend to develop when the top layers of the governance strata remain impassive to perceived changes coming from their own base. All arguments against the assertion or re-assertion of an identity will cause the owners of the same to harden their position.
70. Thus, the rejection of a given polity and its identity by neighbors and others will have repercussions.
71. A polity excluded from the prevailing international order will assert its identity by peaceful or belligerent means.
72. Peaceful assertion of identity will range from placing large advertisements in international publications to world touring cultural events such as art exhibitions (indigenous to that polity) and musical groups to holding international conferences and sporting events on its soil.
73. If these measures seem not to be accepted by the world at large, the rejected polity will resort to belligerency.
74. Belligerent behavior will range from small wars to threat or support of cross-border terrorism.
75. If the polity seeking wider acceptance in the world possesses a former imperial past, the reception of initiatives taken by that polity will be mixed and tied to its imperial history.
76. In response, the governing strata of the ignored polity will choose to resuscitate the past grandeur (perceived or real) of the former empire.
77. Old accounts will be reopened, and grievances will be revisited, with former subjects vehemently opposing the ascendancy of the former imperial polity (their former masters) onto the world stage.
78. The polities that gained independence from the former imperial power will attempt to block the entry of that polity into international cooperation agencies. Failing that, former subjects will do their utmost to impede any decision to be taken in favor of the former imperial power.
79. Thus, shunning a polity by attempting to isolate it in a crowd of other polities will only bolster the resolve of its governing strata and the polity in general. This will harden the identity of those shunned, and they will react with multitudinous prongs.
80. Incidental change of identity due to external contacts will be due to mass media, including motion pictures produced in another polity that contribute to the nature of the change in identity involved.
81. Mass media products, such as motion pictures, will also affect the identity of all those who are exposed to them.
82. The producers of motion pictures will not necessarily reflect the value systems of their own polity.
83. The motion picture producers usually have their own agendas beyond pecuniary interest.
84. In polities where the governing strata are exerting efforts to create or maintain an official identity, they will co-opt and tightly control the media, be it oral, print or electronic.
85. In polities where the polity is proud of its asserted or genuinely unique identity, the individuals producing motion pictures will not need any prodding from the governing strata to exalt that identity in their products.
86. All forms of art and creative expression products carry with them the value systems of their creators; doctrinaire or individual.
87. Translated novels, serials and the like will affect the identity of the receiving identity.
88. Consumer goods will have a similar effect on the identities that adopt and use those products.
89. Development of new technologies will have profound influence on the nature and elements of identities anywhere, but not with the same measure.
90. An identity producing new technologies will undergo change first. When other polities acquire those technologies, they will begin to fall into the sphere of influence of the polity first developing them.
91. Translated works of thought will invariably have a dual effect on the receiving identity. One group will subscribe to the contents, falling under their spell. Another will react by creating counter arguments, essentially to reinforce their own identity, rejecting the translated, imported thoughts.
92. Identity of legislative organs will reflect the identity of the dominant layer of the governance strata.
93. Legislation is directed by the ruling strata of a polity.
94. The more authoritarian the extant governance system in a polity, the less it will allow participation in the legislative process.
95. Authoritarian behavior is not limited to those who make governance of a polity their long-term pursuit. Representatives of other professions, given suitable conditions, will step into the role.
96. The members of a legislature will either have a support base of formally recognized and duly constituted institutions of the polity, or groups interested in advancing their causes.
97. Legislators will always be split due to the differences in their support bases.
98. The splits within the legislature will heal only and temporarily when all parties concerned conceive of a mutual threat to themselves and the polity.
99. Coalitions will be formed within a legislature, when a sub-group fails to secure a majority consensus within a polity.
100. The more authoritarian the governance strata, the greater the chances of corruption in the legislative organs due to lack of checks and balances.
101. A doctrinaire approach to governance will yield an authoritarian governance system.
102. A staunchly partisan sub-group with a single agenda-item will exist in every conceivable type of legislature.
103. In polities where the governing strata have absolute or near-absolute control over the affairs of the polity, the legislature will not be more than a rubber-stamp institution.
104. The more open the polity to new ideas and methods, the slower the legislature in responding to changing conditions in that polity.
105. The legislature will lag behind the activities and works of the thought employers, for the thought employers tend to act either alone or in very small independent groups, as they are rarely if ever members of the legislature.
106. When the polity is dependent on external trade for a large part of its Gross National Product, practitioners from the commercial sector will be more active in the governance and the legislature.
107. The greater reliance of a polity on foreign trade for survival will yield a more active revolving-door effect between the commercial-industrial houses and the governance strata.
108. The more authoritarian a governing stratum, the more it shares values with the judicial organs.
109. In authoritarian polities, the judicial organs will be populated by members of the governing strata.
110. When an identity is transformed into an authoritarian one, the pre-existing judiciary will either be replaced by those sympathetic to the new governance strata, or will be forced to side with it.
111. The newly authoritarian identity will undergo deep convulsions.
1. Not every corner of the world is endowed with all the resources the earth is capable of bestowing.
2. In order to acquire some of the goods not available locally, but in other geographic regions, a polity will have to engage in trade.
3. Those goods not available locally may well include foodstuffs, which will impart quite a bit of urgency to trade.
4. When a polity cannot acquire what it deems necessary to sustain life or life-style, its members may well be prepared to go to war to obtain that to which they think they are entitled. Not much profit may be gained at this stage by trying to reason with them.
5. Conversely, other polities may want those goods and commodities only found in this polity. These will include natural resources, and other polities will be prepared to use military force to obtain what they think is due to them.
6. When unbalanced mutual trade is joined between polities, one of the first casualties is mutual trust. This will manifest itself in arguments over quality, supply quantities, and timing of delivery.
7. Next will come the issue of balance of payments. If polity A is buying goods from polity B, then polity A must pay for them. Usually in some form of currency.
8. Polity A spending currency to purchase goods from polity B will cause a drain on the treasury of polity A, especially, when polity A has not much to sell to polity B.
9. At that point, polity A might even decide to go to war with polity B in order not to pay what it owes to polity B.
10. Thus, the principle of a balance of payments must be kept in mind when trading.
11. Over time, the specialized goods produced in one polity may gain fame under their identity. This will be followed by trademark recognition. Perfumes, cheese, shoes, wine and the like produced by one polity will come to mind when the name of the polity is mentioned.
12. When the commodities produced by one polity gain fame, other polities will begin to produce the same. The copying polities may even use the same or similar brand names.
13. The polity initiating a commodity brand name, whose goods are copied, will object and take action to force the copiers to stop using the original designations. This will cause trade wars. This is one example of protecting the identity of the initiating polity.
14. In selling their commodities, polities will develop not only specific brand names, but also the notion, presented as ‘fact,’ that the commodity in question is best when coming from that polity with the specific identity.
15. This will cause a move toward trade monopoly of a certain item or commodity.
16. A trade monopoly will cause authoritarianism in governance, with all the trappings in personnel and institutions.
1. The reaction to identity construction in a given polity will come from both internal and external sources.
2. It is easier to understand the internal reactions. These will come primarily from groups and individuals who have commitments to given doctrines. Leading this category will be the adherents of organized belief systems operating on the basis of “total life,” where the particular doctrine demands that every action taken by the adherents must conform to the doctrine.
3. The extant doctrinal belief systems are usually the most difficult obstacles to the construction of new official identities.
4. Such doctrinal belief systems have had the time and opportunity to place their version of cosmic order in the minds of their adherents. These need not only be ‘religious,’ but can also be ‘political’ or ‘materialistic’ beliefs as well.
5. Since every doctrinal belief system was created after and in most cases in response to an earlier one, each doctrinal belief system also contains built-in defense mechanisms.
6. The built-in “defense mechanisms” of a doctrinal belief system typically include insistence that it is the only true belief system. By extension, all other competing belief systems will be portrayed as heresies.
7. There will be prescribed sanctions against those who change allegiances by accepting a new belief system. The sanctions against apostates most often begin with threats that the turncoat’s soul will not receive salvation; and he will be forever consigned to eternal torture by whatever means.
8. Some belief systems will permit their adherents to disguise their allegiances. This is done to keep the doctrine alive under conditions threatening to overwhelm their domain. The justification is that it is better to have an underground congregation than have it annihilated.
9. The struggle for primacy will then be conducted through veiled writings and oral reports, aimed first at undermining the efforts to construct the new identity.
10. The existing ethnic identities may also resist the new official identity if the new identity does not conform to already prevailing values. This is especially so when the ethnic identity constitutes a minority within the polity. The minority could exaggerate the attributes of their identity or go to extremes to stand out.
11. Regional identities will also make their presence felt.
12. Regional identities usually give the outward impression that they are born of pride of place.
13. The composition of regional identities will include elements from ethnicities, belief systems, chosen governance systems, and genuine pride of place.
14. The complex form of regional identities will make it difficult for the constructors of official identity to identify the primary underlying cause of the regionalist objections.
15. There will always be competition between polities.
16. The competition between polities is not limited to commerce (markets and a positive balance of payments), natural resources (including population bases) and land (or access to sea for strategic or commercial purposes).
17. Competitions between polities will in time turn into conflicts, if they are not attended to.
18. The conflict between polities may also result from perceptions of previous injustices suffered at the hands of the other side.
19. The reactions to the efforts to create a new identity within a given polity may come from adjacent polities or from across the oceans. (In the future, it is not inconceivable that it may come from other galaxies as well.)
20. The reactions from adjacent polities or from across the oceans will of course be either in opposition or support; in most cases they will take the form of objections.
21. Whether or not the objections are justified on a rational basis will not readily become apparent.
22. The objections will be cloaked in arguments to conceal their actual objectives.
23. The outward objections will be made on the basis of current topics. These topics may include, but are not limited to, ideas of Wilsonian self-determination, F.D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, human rights, Hay’s Open Door policy (precursor of open skies and open markets arguments), the UN charter, and a multitude of daily concerns.
24. Behind most of the objections, regardless of their outward dress, lies the prime reason: maintenance of a certain “world order” preferred by those objecting to the formation of a new identity in a given polity.
25. After all, the new identity is partly conceived in order to alter the existing order.
1. Sub-groupings within a polity will tend to organize themselves around their interests. These will be devoted to the preservation and advancement of the economic and political position of the members banding together.
2. One of the primary means of such organizations is the joint-venture, also referenced as a corporation.
3. Prototypes of joint ventures existed early in human endeavor. As soon as early medieval universities were developed, law faculties sprang up to serve the needs of the merchants functioning within this type of structure, to formalize and to enforce relations between them.
4. Nor are relations of joint-ventures confined to intra-merchant transactions. Governing strata are known to form partnerships with merchants. Some polities and their governing strata encourage this type of venture and prosper; others seek to control their existence. The governing strata supply the capital, and the merchants peddle their wares for maximum profit.
5. It is not unusual therefore for the merchants to be close to the governing strata, if not to maintain outright membership in both endeavors. Therefore, the corporate identity is not confined to commercial transactions.
6. As one result, when necessary, the corporate identity will call upon the governing strata of the polity for military (and other security) protection.
7. The arrangement works so long as the governance strata is able to maintain control of the trade routes or distribution channels with military power.
8. After new markets are opened as a result of new technology, polities will begin establishing joint ventures to exploit new opportunities. Polities, not just their merchants, will begin competing not only commercially, but by extension, also militarily.
9. Ensuing profits lure other polities into the race, who form new joint ventures chartered by their own governance strata, even if under thinly veiled cover.
10. To serve the needs of the joint ventures, various institutions are also developed. These include more facile international banking and credit systems.
11. General distributors are an important part of the mercantile system infrastructure. Originally executing financial ‘factoring’ functions, general distributors perform as intermediary credit advancers and wholesale distribution channels. They are critical to the operation of the mercantile system, as the baronies are to a monarchy.
12. General distributors are the primary agents of the joint ventures, at the cutting edge of marketing and market share, enlarging operations.
13. General distributorships are usually established with expatriates dispatched for the purpose from the originating polity, but with the participation of local capital and persons.
14. The local participation in general distributorships is crucial, for it is their country and the local personnel will know how to approach their countrymen for anything necessary for successful operation.
15. The General distributorships will absorb, finance and carry inventory, allowing the original joint venture at the originating polity more flexibility with higher level credit-extending institutions.
16. The competition between the polities will lead to piracy, with the corporations of one polity preying on the operational instruments of others.
17. The acts of piracy are primarily directed at the general distributorships, markets, or, at least the local principals operating within them.
18. In original mercantilism, rather than short term large gains, the aim of the joint venture was to accumulate wealth over one lifetime, to secure a steady supply of goods from those supplier locations as well as to open markets for manufactured export goods.
19. The new mercantilism seeks immediate benefit to the consolidated annual report, to stave off competition for another year.
20. Originally the principal personnel functioning within the joint ventures were usually the second, third and fourth sons of nobility.
21. Since only the first son of a nobleman inherited the title and the ancestral domain and the attached income, the remaining sons were left without resources. Normally, this would have had an adverse effect on the baronial system, with the remaining sons competing to replace the elder brother to access the fruits of their birthright. New corporations operate in a similar system.
22. By sending these spare sons to distant locales, the new joint ventures guarantee the removal of this potential threat to their social order.
23. This process supports and maintains mercantilism as a social system as well.
24. Mercantilism, as a system, for all practical matters, is a closed one. One must be born into it.
25. As long as the members born into the club respect the unwritten internal rules, and operate accordingly, they are rewarded with a steady income.
26. Being a closed system, mercantilism prevents social mobility; as it is intended to maintain the status quo by freezing individuals in their stations in life.
27. Even after the industrial revolution, when individual entrepreneurs from non-aristocratic backgrounds began amassing wealth, mercantilism adapted itself to the prevailing conditions by co-opting the industrialists into its own ranks.
28. Joint ventures operating in mercantilism strive to acquire additional domains for their seat (home, industry) polities.
29. At that point, mercantilism becomes a support for empire, under whatever designation.
30. Symbiotically, empire became a framework to be preserved for the purpose of maintaining mercantilism.
31. Any system that wishes to perpetuate itself will establish institutions within for the purpose. In its empire framework, mercantilism also takes steps in that direction by devising an education system. This is an amalgamation of formal schooling, coupled with a structured apprenticeship.
32. The mercantilist educational system requires a stair-step series of schools for its needs. There are institutions where the officials responsible for daily routine and low-level operations are trained.
33. At the highest level, select and selective universities specialize in programs to train individuals in the arts of thinking and adapting to changing conditions without losing sight of the ultimate objective: how to maintain the system and extract the greatest wealth from sources.
34. The graduates of the select and selective universities are also put through an elaborate apprenticeship program. In the end, successful functionaries rise to elevated positions including “governor generalships” under whatever designation.
35. As the affairs of the joint venture companies begin to involve the offices of the empire, the governing strata of the seat polity begin to take a deeper functional interest in the operations and policies of the joint venture companies.
36. This leads to oversight committees, whose existence is at first kept a state secret of the polity.
37. At the same time, the empire is competing against other empires. This is a further reason for the polity’s governance strata to get involved in the affairs of the joint venture companies; for the empire will need additional resources, to coordinate the struggle against the opposition.
38. This competition is certainly not confined to the commercial arena.
39. At first, the competition is waged in overseas territories between two (or more) rival empires. This is militarily safer than engaging each other in their own territories. The spoils will be obtained overseas as well, in the form of markets and sources of raw materials unobtainable elsewhere.
40. A group of people, from the edges of the empire, will decide to try a new governance or belief system; one that has not previously been applied to a polity at large. It is also decidedly against the mercantilist system. This will add further complications to the mercantilist new world order.
41. It must be borne in mind that polities are also continually struggling with internal ferment. There are several competitions, waged primarily in the minds of the masses.
42. Economic, political and military systems always form a trivet, and no governance system is immune to the interlacing. This is especially important to keep in mind when the governance strata is bent on changing the governance system. Demands of theocracy are not the same as empire.
43. A theocratic stratum, despite its powers, cannot by itself secure the structure of an independent state.
44. The belief system(s) that existed prior to the establishment of the new official belief system is formidably resilient.
45. Those with vested interests within the governance strata of the land will also force the theocracy into an uneasy alliance with themselves.
46. One reason is that the governance strata will find it difficult to hold court without at least a ceremonial acquaintance with the theocracy. The two dogmas clash, and must call a temporary truce. The final account will be settled later.
47. The result is a combination of secular joint ventures operating under the control of the established governing strata. This control will be cloaked with spiritual good wishes from the new belief system hierarchy. The latter will be striving for total control at a later date.
48. That is, until a string of lone but powerful voices begin speaking out from within the ranks of the theocracy.
49. Ranging from Wyclif, to Hus, to Luther, and Henry VIII, these types of individuals are office holders of the belief system governance, but all challenge the excesses committed in the name of it. They seek their own form of equality and reform.
50. Rediscovery of pre-theocratic texts adds further fuel to the raging debate. These texts contain elements directly challenging the received wisdom of the theocracy, or, if you will, theodicy.
51. Only after strenuous efforts expended by ‘new theologians’ and their lay followers, largely engaging in paradiastole, pre-theocratic texts are co-opted into the theocracy, as if they had always been members.
52. But the curiosity of some individuals prods them forth. In this instance, the nagging question is: what was there as a governing system before theocracy? Some groups, aware of the connections between identities and economic benefits, are willing to take direct action without waiting for a definitive answer. They will even camouflage their secular knowledge and intentions under a religious identity. So, free enterprise (any initiative can be undertaken by anyone) will begin battling a more structured and immobile governance and economic system, such as mercantilism (where only heads of joint venture houses are allowed initiatives).
53. After a suitable incubation period, fermenting ideas will begin circulating. One of the results of this process was the French Revolution. The effects of that revolution on identity and identity formation is indelible. Unlike the Puritans, who regarded free enterprise as their co-equal identity, and cloaked it under a belief system, the French citoyen desired a broader set of freedoms.
54. In the aftermath of the 1789 revolution, there emerged in France a new type of identity; it emerged, in part, by resuscitating forms older than the prevailing coalition between theocracy and empire; with mercantilism providing the high level glue holding together the partnership.
55. This new citizen identity directly challenges the governance by theocracy, but does not stop there. As it develops, it also becomes a grave threat to the empire form of governance, along with its vital club-mate, mercantilism.
56. The idea of a “citizen,” as opposed to a “subject,” (be he subject to the nobility, clergy or a commercial enterprise) is one of the ideas emanating from the movement.
57. All polities whose governance strata subscribe to “subject” and ruler method of governance system will be alarmed by the development, anywhere, of the germ of a new world order; unless they themselves are creating a new one.
58. Nonetheless, the idea of “citizen,” as in group membership, with privileges not found in any other system, took root.
59. The established governance stratum was not, and will not be willing to relinquish their hallowed privileges without a struggle. That, of course, requires a change in the governance system as well.
60. It must be remembered that individualism is quite different than citizenship.
61. Not every polity received this citizen idea with equal set of rights. Any adaptation of the term for the purpose of creating a new identity came with special restrictions.
62. Whereas one type of citizenship for individual participation within the new corporate identity provided rights, another practice involved the subjugation of the individual to the special segment of the governance strata of the respective polity.
63. In both cases, the outward wordage of the rights is the same. It is the application that makes the difference. In one, the individual can make choices, whereas in the other the individual is expected to set aside his individual allegiances to family, ethnic group and belief systems in favor of allegiance only toward the governance strata.
64. This, of course, is very reminiscent of earlier, belief-system based demands on the individual, where membership in a particular belief system demanded that all members in that particular belief renounce all other ties, ethnic and familial.
65. In this manner, those belief systems strove to harvest, from their neighbors, able men for membership. This had the effect of not only swelling the ranks of the gaining belief system, but also weakening the populations who were still in opposition.
66. Of course, the energetic belief system governing strata believed that the men so co-opted would also convert their families and relations as well.
67. Those acquiescing to the conversion were granted additional privileges, in the form of economic incentives or outright grants.
68. Having been so rewarded, the new converts, fortified with their new identity, are ready for service in joint ventures as they may now be directed by the governance strata.
1. Belief systems exist for the purpose of explaining phenomenon otherwise unfathomable to the uninitiated.
2. A belief system will have an authority, a central figure, or a collective set of values dominating the explanations provided therein.
3. Not all belief systems will have a deity or deities.
4. Not all belief systems will have an authoritative user’s manual, or doctrinal reference book.
5. All belief systems will have associated rituals.
6. The existing belief systems, for the convenience of discussants, have been divided between revealed or other.
7. A revealed belief system includes a text containing the doctrine.
8. Those belief systems that do not have a doctrinal text will substitute rituals instead.
9. A belief system, more often than not, will have been imported by the polity adhering to it.
10. A belief system imported from another culture will be modified by the receiving polity to suit its needs and requirements.
11. A belief system does not need to have a governing hierarchy.
12. A belief system with a governing or administrative hierarchy will be more authoritarian than others.
13. This is also true for the ecumenical belief systems.
14. The doctrinal belief systems will incorporate expansionism as a part of their ecumene.
15. Some belief systems will reject accepting adult converts to their ranks.
16. In displaying fear of accepting adults into its ranks, a belief system displays a distrust in the motives of humans not belonging to its ranks from birth.
17. A number of belief systems seek to perpetuate themselves only through natural increase among their adherents.
18. Some belief systems aggressively seek converts as a means of expansion or even survival.
19. Some belief systems do not pay any attention to conversions or defections.
20. A number of polities will adopt a particular belief system as the basis of its support, or even existence.
21. When a belief system is elevated to the status of official doctrine of a polity, it will become more intolerant of other systems.
22. In the case of an official belief system, the governing strata of a polity will wish to inject that belief system into the identity of the polity.
23. Belief systems will interact with each other, regardless of the intentions of their founder(s), adherents or enforcers.
24. Due to the interaction between belief systems, each system will borrow ideas, rituals and doctrines.
25. Belief systems will borrow from each other due to the practices of their adherents.
26. When a new belief system is overlaid on another by authoritative or even voluntary action, the previous system is not replaced wholesale.
27. Dual practices of worship and ritual will continue, upon the arrival of a new belief system in a polity.
28. At first flush, the commentators defending a newly formalized belief system will attack the old.
29. Failing to eradicate all traces of the old belief system, commentators of belief systems will formalize some of the prevailing mélange.
30. Ideas from unrelated periods and belief systems will be borrowed during the commentary process.
31. New influences will enter into a belief system during the commentary process, and those influences will eventually filter into the rituals.
32. Those individuals seeking answers to the imponderables of the belief system will invariably contribute to the mélange of belief systems.
33. Comments and observations on a belief system will eventually be read, misunderstood, distrusted, condemned; nonetheless, they will be disseminated.
34. The ensuing misunderstandings will prod others to produce additional commentaries in support or refutation.
35. Those commentators whose works are widely read will be elevated to the status of geniuses.
36. When the governance strata of a polity perceives the doctrines constructed by the widely-read commentators to be useful in the governance process, those doctrines will be co-opted as standard policy of the concerned polity.
37. In time, the officially sanctioned and adopted doctrines will be replaced by others, similarly developed.
38. The older ideas are never completely purged or forgotten. They will always have a following even after long spans of time elapse.
39. The older doctrines will be revived periodically as the perceptions of the governance strata or the members of the polity at large evolve or undergo cycles in response to changing conditions.
40. The revival of older doctrines or creation of new ones are born by the desire to make a change or to retain familiar and traditional modes of life.
41. Efforts expended to bring about change are affected by the desire to improve living conditions, materially or spiritually.
42. This is to preserve what was received in the form of the identity; to purify and advance the polity’s identity, to aid its survival into the future.
43. Altruism plays little part in the process. Altruism is fed by a desire for immortality.
44. Not every development in the affairs of humans can be foreseen.
45. Only general patterns will be discernible, and precautions taken can be effective only in the most general sense.
46. The changes in the conditions cannot be effectively foreseen due to nature’s random design.
47. Nature maintains a random pattern in human affairs so as to prevent a straight-jacket, fossilized doctrinal path to development.
48. It is the unforeseen, out-of-pattern developments that affect human affairs most.
49. The driving force of those unforeseen developments are the ideas; their reception, understanding or misunderstanding, and the mode of their application to the lives concerned.
50. Artifacts and documents indicate that each identifiable culture possessed a belief system; an effort and an approach to explain phenomenon otherwise unfathomable.
51. Each belief system designated a focal point for the purpose. Earliest systems relied on visible imagery for their foci. These ranged from an image (mountain) to a combination of an image and a belief (Aton as solar disk and Pharaoh as Aton’s earthly representative).
52. Even when the belief system relied on imaginary personages, as most polytheistic systems do, their concrete images were also created for visual reinforcement in the form of statues and statuettes.
53. Transition from multiple-deities to one-god may be credited to better awareness of the surroundings, understanding of the causes of physical events (fire can be created by humans as well) or improvement of mental faculties.
54. Monotheistic systems are largely founded on an act of faith, a willingness to entrust one’s future to one unexplainable authority instead of many.
55. This economizing in the number of deities may have simplified worship procedures.
56. On the other hand, reduction in the number of deities increased the rigidity of the worship ceremonies and led to the suspension of a series of ‘flexibilities,’ such as the ability of an individual to choose one personal deity out of many.
57. Belief systems need not have deities. A set of principles attributed to a person or ‘path’ will do just fine (Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism); or a given combination of one or more will be acceptable.
58. The story is familiar: A young man falls in love with a beautiful young lady. She is from a wealthy family, and he is of exceedingly modest means. Her father forbids the union. The culture is not amenable to elopement. The young man persists. In desperation, to dissuade the young man, her father sets impossible conditions. If the young suitor can perform those specified and superhuman tasks, then the father will permit the marriage. The young man, in his fervor, tackles the assignments; He moves mountains, he drains oceans. Against all odds, he succeeds in outdoing all that was asked of him. Somewhere along the line, the life-view that so thoroughly dominated the young man’s vision, abruptly shifts. He is no longer in love with the beautiful young maiden. He has not only outgrown the maiden, but his emotions and the societal norms and earthly concerns. For all practical purposes, he has become a saint; and often he is so recognized. This approach of ‘trial by fire’ has been used in more than one culture and belief system to construct its own foundations, and identity.
1. A polity will contain a multitude of distinct identities.
2. When a polity is formed, it will occupy a certain territory, a homeland.
3. As the polity consolidates its hold on its homeland with specific defended boundaries, it will gradually develop its natural identity.
4. Within the specified land, there will be sub-groups extant while the dominant or primary identity is established.
5. The sub-groups will have their own identities due to original differences such as ethnic origins, belief, governance and economic systems.
6. Due to the original differences, the sub-groups will resist assimilation into the dominant group’s identity.
7. Where the dominant identity is intolerant of the sub-groups’ desire to maintain their distinct and separate identities and their resistance, the latter will either fight or migrate.
8. When the dominant identity is tolerant of sub-groups and sub-identities within its polity, the members of the latter will rise to positions of prominence. This they will do in order to guarantee the maintenance of their specific identity.
9. When the tolerance of the dominant identity becomes widely known, other sub-groups will desire to migrate into that polity’s domain.
10. In-migration by sub-groups into such a dominant identity’s polity will increase the proportion of non-dominant groups in that polity.
11. The in-migration of sub-groups into a polity’s domain will increase, if the dominant identity embarks upon an expansionary policy.
12. The migration process will gain fresh impetus when other dominant identities become intolerant of the sub-groups in their polities.
13. Some dominant identities will even force the sub-groups living in their domains to emigrate.
14. The expelled sub-groups will tend to form alliances or coalitions upon settling within the territory of a tolerant polity.
15. Every sub-group settling within the domain of a tolerant identity will have at least two factions.
16. The first generation of one of the factions within the in-migrating sub-group will be willing to assimilate into the dominant identity.
17. The opposing faction will resist assimilation into the dominant identity at great cost.
18. By the third generation, the descendants of the original immigrants will work toward reviving their original identity.
19. When the collective population of the sub-groups within a dominant identity grows approximately equal to that of the main identity, a mosaic identity is invariably developed in that polity.
20. Recognition of the existence of a mosaic identity in a polity will alter the policies of the dominant identity in that polity.
21. A sub-group identity is derived from a mother identity, which may or may not have an established polity and defended borders.
22. If the mother identity does not have an established and independent polity, the primary energies of the sub-groups belonging to that identity will be to constitute one replete with a land territory.
23. A mother identity may be in existence within a polity distinctly different than itself.
24. Identities are brought into polities of which they were never a part when another polity embarks upon an expansionary mode, engulfing others.
25. When a mother identity engulfed by another identity embarks upon the path of landed independence, it will call for dispersed sub-groups to unite.
26. Often, the impetus for the mother identity’s independence will come from the dispersed sub-groups.
27. An idea precedes any action. Ideas pertaining to the independence of an identity are first disseminated through literature.
28. When the literature of an engulfed mother identity is deep-rooted, it will be printed abroad and re-introduced.
29. If the literature of an identity is nascent, forgeries will be attempted with a view to give the impression that it is old.
30. The forged literature will be staunchly exclusive of all other identities, and in favor of the identity it seeks to enforce.
31. The forged literature, by its nature, cannot be attributed to any living author, even if there is evidence.
32. The forged literature will then form the backdrop against which new literature will be developed.
33. The new literature will be directed towards the establishment of an independent literature.
34. The dominant polity in which the re-emergence is taking place will react in two ways.
35. If the dominant polity is a permissive mosaic identity, then the re-emergence will be applauded. This is rare.
36. When the dominant identity is authoritarian, the new authors will be persecuted.
37. The sub-groups living abroad will seek to enlist the help of international organizations in favor of the re-emergence of the identity.
38. The new literature and the new efforts to create a new polity will merge.
39. When the mother identity finally attains an independent polity, it will invite back sub-groups heretofore living abroad.
40. Not all sub-groups will heed the call to return.
41. As the mother polity gains recognition on its own and, especially, attains economic viability, that influence will be felt in sub-groups living abroad.
42. The mother identity will attempt to influence the affairs of the dominant identity where her sub-groups are living.
43. The identity of the host will be at stake.
44. In response, the dominant identity where the sub-groups are living will insist on developing an official identity and require adherence to it by subtle or forcible means.
45. Either the host identity will succeed in its efforts to enforce the official identity, or the dominant polity will disintegrate.
46. In extreme cases, the dominant polity will either demand total assimilation into the official identity, or even expel sub-groups that resist.
47. The dominant identity may fail in its efforts to enforce the newly designed (or, re-designed) official identity.
48. When the official identity fails, the dominant polity will fragment into smaller identities.
49. Fragmentation of an identity will also fragment the polity into smaller and distinctly separate identities.
50. Mosaic identities, for example empires, by definition harbor many identities.
51. Empires are administered by a governing strata and, subordinate to them, a bureaucracy.
52. The governing strata will be from the dominant identity that established the empire.
53. The members of the bureaucracy will be primarily drawn from the dominant identity, especially at the top, with an appropriate sprinkling of individuals from the sub-groups of the polity.
54. The ruling strata will establish a pattern for perpetuating itself, in its own image, to maintain the empire.
55. The primary means of perpetuating the governing strata is through education that exists in its own time.
56. The governing strata will also be interested in keeping the mosaic identity by means of as unified belief system.
57. A belief system encompasses more than “religion.” (See 09 Identity of Belief Systems.)
58. The prevailing attitude of the governing strata is that when the majority of the population adheres to the same belief system, then the polity will have a greater base of commonality leading to a more uniform identity.
59. When the governing strata of a mosaic identity are confident of its identity, the educational system will not be heavy-handed, not forcing the sub-groups to learn all about the dominant identity.
60. When the governing strata is self-conscious about the attributes of its own identity it will then insist that the sub-groups learn everything about the dominant identity. The education system will be designed with that primary purpose.
61. The larger the number and proportion in population of sub-groups in an identity, the more controls the governing strata will place on the polity.
62. When the polity has chosen a system of single official governance participation unit, that unit, apart from all other organs of the polity, will also seek to perpetuate itself independently of the general bureaucracy.
63. The single official governance participation unit will seek to insert its own members and representatives into all institutions of the polity.
64. Given the large proportion of non-dominant identity in a given polity, the single official governance participation unit will seek to have representatives also selected and carefully trained from each of the sub-group identities.
65. The single official governance participation unit, by co-opting members of the sub-group identities, will seek to extend its own influence and identity to those sub-group identities.
66. The harsher the policies of the governance strata, the more vehement will be the response from the sub-groups.
67. The governing strata will either choose to relax its rule, thereby hastening the dissolution of the mosaic identity, or increase the level of authoritarian nature of the administration.
68. When the sub-groups within a mosaic identity demand more autonomy in all endeavors of life, the governing strata may, at least in outward form, allow it in the name of harmony.
69. Upon receiving the sought-out autonomy, there will be an outpouring of sentiments from the sub-groups in various forums, including media and publications.
70. To keep those outpourings under some control, to prevent dissolution of the mosaic identity, the governing strata and the single official governance participation unit will introduce additional institutions to reduce the influence of those sentiments. This will again be done in the name of unity and harmony.
71. Newly constituted institutions, intended to control the new gains made by the sub-groups, will be resented by the latter. The sub-groups will seek ways to circumvent the workings of the new institutions.
72. The governing strata will respond by imposing restrictions on foodstuffs and other necessities supplied to the sub-groups from the central administration in order to enforce its control.
73. The governing strata will also create an official identity, if not already in existence, for the mosaic polity as a further means of controlling the sub-groups.
74. The official identity will very likely be a modification of the dominant identity; modified to induce the sub-groups to accept it.
75. The single official governance participation unit and other institutions of the mosaic identity will publicly applaud and reward those members of the sub-groups who openly accept and strive to expand the official identity and penalize those who reject and work against it.
76. The official belief system will be expanded and enforced by the governance strata as a part of the official identity.
77. The success of all control policies introduced by the governance strata will depend on the quality of life and standard of living in the polity.
78. If there are discernible and significant differences between the members of the dominant identity and the sub-groups in their standards of living, all other policies will eventually fail. This will hold true regardless of which side, be it the dominant identity or the sub-groups, have the better standard of living.
79. When the expectations are unmet, discord will ensue between identities.
80. After open discord starts, no amount of concessions made by the governance strata will please the polity at large.
81. As the concessions to sub-groups increase, the members of the dominant identity will begin to display displeasure.
82. The members of the dominant identity will pressure the governance strata to curtail or rescind the concessions thus made to the sub-groups.
83. Rescinding any of the concessions to the sub-groups will not satisfy anyone. At that point, it is too late to stop the process.
84. The dissolution of a mosaic identity need not immediately be in the form of sub-groups seceding from the polity.
85. The sub-groups intent on asserting their own identities within the mosaic identity will acquire land for themselves, only for their own use.
86. The land acquired by and for the exclusive use of the sub-groups will take the form of gated or segregated communities, restricted access settlements of all types, summer camps, school systems, heath welfare and burial and worship societies within the mosaic identity.
87. The secret information gathering apparatus of the official governance participation unit and other official institutions cannot be underestimated as the sub-groups begin asserting their identities.
88. When a mosaic identity has its population approximately equally divided between the dominant identity and sub-groups, there will be several internal information gathering organizations to inform the governance strata of the polity.
89. A large majority of the information gathering organizations will be officially sanctioned.
90. There will also be unsanctioned information gathering organizations, formed ad hoc by various formally recognized institutions.
91. The original or ostensible objectives of all information gathering organizations will be to advise the governance strata of the tendencies within the polity.
92. Neighboring polities, and others within the international system, will carefully watch all developments, and in rare cases will suppress their urge to participate in the proceedings.
93. Influences from sources outside the polity will increase, causing the targeted polity to respond in kind, if it can.
94. The governing strata and subordinate institutions of the mosaic identity will formulate reactionary policies, aimed both at outside and inside groups.
95. As a part of the reactionary policies, the governing strata will enter into coalitions with neighboring or other polities within the international system.
96. When members of the coalition(s) formed are sufficiently large in population or economic strength, the conflicts will be globalized.
97. Thought employers and the associations they form will be involved in large measure with the coalitions, either because they find this to be a necessary competition for the survival of their identity or they will be induced by the governance strata.
98. Apart from the operatives of the sanctioned or unsanctioned information gathering organizations, armed paramilitary formations will be formed within the polity.
99. The acknowledged or concealed paramilitary formations will be engaged in suppression of activities of the sub-groups, or to incite the activities first for the same purpose.
100. As the tensions between the dominant identity and the sub-groups increase, private groups within the polity will be formed, to allow the sub-groups access to goods and services otherwise denied them by the institutional barriers of the dominant identity.
101. The private organizations formed within the sub-groups for access to goods and services will operate primarily for pecuniary gain of its founders and operatives, and will not be entirely sanctioned by the members of the sub-groups.
102. The private organizations of the sub-groups will be against the existing rules and regulations of the polity.
103. The success of the sub-group private organizations will spawn more of the same.
104. In an effort to listen to the developments, internal information gathering organizations will penetrate the sub-group private organizations yet allow them to exist and operate.
105. In due time, the sub-group private organizations will extend their operations to include sedition.
106. Competition among the sub-group private organizations will develop, leading to formation of armed formations within each.
107. Competition among the sub-group private organizations will turn into a low level armed conflict.
108. Competition among the sub-group private organizations will lead each to seek help and cooperation from the institutions and information gathering organizations of the dominant identity as a means of gaining an advantage over competitors.
109. As the sub-group private organizations amass greater resources from their activities, so they will seek to include the members of the governance strata in their operations by means of offering cooperative individuals from the governance strata pecuniary advantages.
110. Due to the cooperation of the governance strata members in the activities of the sub-group private organizations, monopolies of scarce or widely demanded goods and services will develop.
111. The new monopolies will operate, by definition, entirely outside the institutional and mandated channels of distribution.
112. The new monopolies will cater to the members of the polity at large, ironically without discrimination, supplying legal or extra-legal goods and services no longer available or those that never were available through regular channels.
113. Anti-corruption campaigns will be mounted by the governance strata to reassert its own authority.
114. If the sub-group private organizations have penetrated sufficiently high levels of the governing strata, all anti-corruption campaigns will fail.
115. Only smooth and free functioning economic identity will prevent or lessen the influence and operation of private organizations, be they armed or monopolistic.
116. When the commercial identity of a polity is established and is operational, new internal and external coalitions will emerge in the form of cartels and price-fixing agreements.
117. The judicial and legislative identities will be faced with new challenges, and will have to deal with matters not necessarily as a matter of laws, but the interpretations in the form of loopholes.
118. The dynamics of the identity will be in the direction of further sub-divisions of the identity of the polity, until each sub-group is satisfied with its own identity and the conditions under which it lives.
119. This will scarcely happen, as the dominant identities and the related polities will not willingly allow dissolutions.
120. It must not be forgotten that identity transformations will take place through the developments advocated or effected by its natural members, or by external intervention.
121. The external intervention on a given identity may take place while under occupation by another power, or through the manipulation of the international order.
122. Apart from the substantive and structural transformations, the owners’ perceptions of a given identity will also change, as well as how it is perceived by others.
123. Perceptions of reception of an identity change, because the perception of what is valid changes.
124. What does not change is the fact that there is an identity or collection of identities and that they continue to interact.
125. Another constant will be that identities are attacked from the outside, either deliberately or incidentally.
126. The process of natural evolution, and external attacks on an identity, not only causes identities to be transformed but also influences how identities are perceived internally and externally.
127. During the transformation of identity process, a number of sub-groups will coalesce to preserve what they perceive to be the common points of their identities; to collectively benefit from larger scale activities.
128. The coalescing sub-groups may be civilian or armed in origin.
129. The dynamics of sub-groups coalescing constitutes an example of a dynamic with long term cycles of massing and sub-dividing.
130. So far, it has not been shown that the accumulated knowledge has been understood by a governing strata at large, with respect to the identity dynamics.
131. Conversely, the governance strata believe that they can control the cycles of coalescence and divisions of identities by various means, including economics and technology.
132. Natural identities also evolve and transform by the need and desire to access a larger share of wealth and living standards in existence.
133. When the access of an identity to a larger share of the existing resources are limited, the method of access will change.
134. Inside a mosaic identity, when the resources are limited, the access of sub-groups to those resources available will be restricted by the dominant identity.
135. The dominant identity will first look after its own interests.
1. The designer communities are hard at work in creating computer systems that will in turn design virtual humans. These virtual humans will need to have identities. Will these virtual humans brag about their creators, claim that their humans were more intelligent than the humans of another brand?
2. Or worse, will the virtual humans immediately set out to battle each other, for primacy over resources? After all, the humans are creating these virtual humans in their own images, biases and fragilities.
3. Computers are already designed, built and programmed to have very specific serial numbers. They can already identify each other by hardware (nalburiye) and software (tuhafiye).
4. The current heuristic software can adapt to physical conditions and physical choices. The designers, on the other hand, will introduce emotional entries and partialities into the software, reflecting their own intractable preferences.
5. What are the human designers’ preference in terms of human emotion substitution going to be, as the software in existence as yet cannot respond on the emotional plane?
6. The definitions fashioned and factored by the designers at this stage will invariably influence the later day variants of the same, as the subject is not technology that can be leapfrogged.
7. The manifestations of emotions in virtual humans will create a backlash from other designers, in their versions of virtual humans. Thus, the eternal competition among human polities will be transferred to virtual polities.
8. The thought employer observers who have the greatest chance of studying human thought patterns, and their results, often get bogged down in a small corner, usually due to exigencies of professional life (tenure, promotion-requiring publications that in turn demand specialization).
9. Then the thought employer does not undertake the applicable attempt to communicate the findings of those observations to the computer designers. Or, the thought employer’s attempts are completely ignored.
10. The designers tend to believe they can cure all societal ills with their creations.
11. Thought employers passionately believe they have access to accumulated and profound knowledge of all societal ills and their cures.
12. Neither the designer, nor the thought employer are able to communicate with each other. This non-communication is ironic in the age of new means and modes of communication, in most cases fostered by the fact that successful designers have not even been through a general education process and the thought employers have avoided non-science books.
13. The sin of the thought employer is greater, as the life of the polity is simply too precious to leave to a single specialty.
14. Thus, interactions will take place among identities. The final effect of those interactions will be decided by the members of identities concerned, without forgetting that an ‘armed’ visit will always be returned in kind.
15. The governing strata do not lean toward expending efforts to bridge the ensuing gap between competing identities.
16. Large organizations within a polity need and use all innovations that can be mustered, to remain ahead of the competition.
17. Many a polity has already attempted to forgo human folly in favor of new technology in the belief that the latter will conquer the former.
18. Those who believe this assumption have always been sadly disappointed.
19. The governance strata, on the other hand, always pays attention to human folly; even if only to exploit it for the benefit of the governance strata.
20. The educational system of a polity will reflect the approach of that polity to governance.
21. If the educational system of a polity exhibits a division between elite and non-elite educational institutions, and is acknowledged as such, then the governing strata is first and foremost engaged in perpetuating itself to remain in governance.
22. The danger is greatest when the illusion of education is given to those who attend the educational institutions, when in reality an indoctrination exercise is engaged. This is valid for both the elite and the non-elite varieties.
23. The image of superiority acquired by individuals in an educational institution is invariably harmful to the polity.
24. That a given community will have a specific Identity in a polity is already discussed. A community need not be ethnically based. Designers are one of the tools of the governing strata, and as such they will designate themselves as a rather influential community within the polity, without specifically becoming a part of the governance strata.
25. On the other hand, the community of designers will choose to ally themselves with the governing strata by embracing governing strata attributes.
26. Of course, even in a highly structured non-socially-mobile polity the community of designers are prone to compete with each other, thus creating rival sub-communities. This is not much different in effect than the various forms and incarnations of the Praetorian Guard phenomenon.
27. This type of competition within a community, despite some other beneficial effects of competition, will not profit the polity; instead, the infighting will weaken its capabilities.
28. During this intra-community competition, the identities of the individuals will come into conflict, not only with the opposing communities but also within their own factions.
29. As designer communities engage each other in competition, depending on what is at stake, they will resort to extreme measures to win.
30. Extreme competitive measures will finally begin to affect the internal identity of the designer community (much like any other community).
31. This, in turn, will create disgruntled individuals who cannot abide by the new identity of the community. These disgruntled individuals will then turn on the community of designers.
32. If the governance strata do not intervene effectively, then the internecine fighting will negatively affect not only the future of the governance strata, but also the polity.
33. As the technology develops, the interpersonal relations, which are the basis of all human relations, are forced to change.
34. Even the construction of the first fireplace weakened the bond between the ruler and his nobles, re-structuring the sleeping arrangements into different rooms, thereby reducing intimate contact.
35. Progressively, each new technological development continued to increase the distance between individuals, lessening the bonds that constitute an identity.
36. New technologies will continue to emerge. Each new technology will contribute to the related change in the identity.
37. When individuals work at computer terminals, physically separated from each other, they interact antiseptically and without the attendant germinating qualities of human contact.
38. Organizations and institutions within a polity will sooner-or-later recognize the effects of this process on identity.
39. The isolation of the individual in a cubicle or in front of a terminal will be seen by institutions as an opportunity to divide identity further.
40. The efforts to divide identity will work only to the benefit of those who are dividing the identity.
41. Any identity that is divided cannot benefit itself.
42. When a mosaic identity does not have checks and balances built into its structure for governance, the dominant institutions within will attempt to pit the sub-groups within that mosaic identity against each other.
43. This is especially valid for mosaic identities where the sub-groups are roughly equal in population to the dominant identity.
44. The objective of pitting one identity against another in a given polity is to keep the sub-groups busy with each other, to induce them to lose sight of the operations of the dominant identity.
45. The internal organs of a polity will also be emboldened by the actions and policies of the governance strata, and attempt to penetrate the sub-groups for their own purposes – apart from the general policies of the governance strata.
46. The activities of the officially constituted organs of a polity will take on the importance of a checks and balances system, if such a system is not provided in the organizational principles of the polity concerned.
47. The organs of the mosaic identity will then form unsanctioned checks and balances according to the internal vision of such equations within each institution, in competition against each other.
48. The vision of each institution will be at variance with each other but will reflect the identity of the organization involved, at variance with the identity they are charged to safeguard.
49. The institutions involved will invariably be striving for prominence over the competing institutions.
50. Although each institution in the competition for prominence starts from the same basic premise, namely preservation and continuance of the identity that spawned them, each will have its own vision of how that goal should be accomplished.
51. The institutions in a mosaic identity will also be at variance with each other in the competition for prominence as to what the end result should be.
52. The ultimate objective of each institution is to maintain a governance system under which the institutions can exist, grow and attain dominance over all others.
53. When the institutions concerned realize that they are being blocked in their vision and actions by other institutions within the polity, they will strive to form coalitions.
54. The coalitions may be with the sympathetic segments of the governance strata, or with other institutions; depending on the influence calculus attempted by the concerned parties.
55. In an effort to gain the upper hand in the large scale competition with others, the formally constituted institutions in a polity may forcefully back candidates for entrance into the ranks of the governance strata who are perceived to be sympathetic to that institution.
56. This will further weaken whatever checks and balances may have been built into the organizing principles of the polity, to keep the polity under the authority of the governance strata.
57. As a result, the governance strata will begin losing control of the future to the institutionalized functionaries, who may or may not have a broad vision for identity as their primary focus is their own power base in the institution.
58. All coalitions and alliances in an authoritarian mosaic identity will be attempted in secret, for advantage purposes.
59. All rival institutions will discover such secret alliances, and will manage suitable means to leak the information to broader audiences both domestic and international.
60. By leaking the coalition and cooperation arrangements, the institution leaking the information is acting out of self-interest, to gain ascendancy over rivals.
61. When the institutions involved in the struggle for primacy employ or command large numbers of personnel, some will be assigned to tasks unrelated to the original mission of the institution not originally found in their charters.
62. A portion of the personnel assigned to an institution by formal charter provisions will be diverted into formations of secret armed militia.
63. The armed groups spawned by formally chartered institutions against their charters will have a dual aim: to thwart other institutions’ efforts and to act as a decoy.
64. The decoy function is much more elaborate and difficult to detect, as the decoy will have to act as if it is working against the interests and objectives of the institution that spawned it.
65. The purpose of the decoy function is to attract and discover the identity of the opposition under double or triple disguise.
66. Once the opposition is discovered, then it is possible to deal with it more effectively.
67. The decoy method will be used by a large number of institutions, especially in governance systems intolerant of open opposition or expression of views.
68. The decoy method is always preemptive.
69. Those in opposition to the entrenched governance system may not be effectively organized due to the active counter measures of the internal security organs of the identity, but their views will eventually find support from outside polities and identities; as long as the opposition’s views suits the needs and objectives of those outside entities.
70. Narcissism will be used as a means of directing the desires and thoughts of individuals who are not aware of the process.
71. Narcissism will be used much like panem et circenses, to distract the masses away from the activities of the governance strata.
72. In no restriction polities, narcissism will be used in ways that reflect the methods of more authoritarian brethren.
73. The institutions engaged in either openly authoritarian methods or re-direction of desires and thoughts will always claim that their efforts are expended in favor of the masses they serve.
1. There are always secret identities in every polity.
2. The purpose of constituting a secret identity is to escape the prevailing rules in the environment in which the identity is established.
3. Some secret identities are regular identities, forced underground by the dominant identity.
4. Some secret identities are formed to gain advantage over other identities in the same polity.
5. Further secret identities are formed in order to secure the interests of the governance strata.
6. No secret identity can remain secret forever. Most, if not all attributes of a secret identity will be uncovered in time; be it belief system, commercial, official or any other.
7. Whatever reason may have impelled the formation of a secret identity, left entirely unchecked and un-audited, it will corrupt itself.
8. Whatever the identity, it will adhere to the principles adumbrated in this work.
1. An old Turkish proverb states: “Do not buy the house; instead, buy the neighbor.” Of course, there is no question of purchasing humans here. The admonition suggests that good neighbors are more important than the model or construction of a piece of real estate. Peace of mind is the primary issue.
2. Similarly, the designation applied to the governance style is unimportant. What matters is how and on what bases the governance of an identity is managed; with hobnail boots or fleeting glass slippers.
3. Even in the twentieth century many polities styled themselves a Republic (although modified by other appellations attached to the designation), while the application was much more draconian than the original intention or implication. The authoritarianism of those republics, contrasted with neighboring monarchies, makes the point more clear.
4. The U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Constitution that followed legitimized the pursuit of happiness as the primary goal for identities; individual or group. The original idea was, of course, articulated during a much earlier period.
5. Most belief systems were developed, ostensibly, to serve a higher authority than homo sapiens. Those belief systems have been usurped, knowingly or otherwise, by the governance strata of all polities.
6. The shift from serving a higher authority to pursuit of happiness took time, pending further developments of various kinds.
7. Even in the time of serving a higher authority, pursuit of happiness was not ignored or neglected by homo sapiens. It was a pursuit practiced rather clandestinely, given the penalties, usually falling under the rubric of vice.
8. This is one of the reasons why authoritarian governance systems (including theocracies) attacked vice viciously, because anything declared to come under that heading was (and is) seen to be a challenge to the established order.
9. The pursuit of happiness later began drifting into consumerism and ends up becoming narcissism.
10. In the formats of consumerism and narcissism, the pursuit of happiness became a vehicle for exploitation, especially through the media, by consumer goods companies for purely pecuniary interest.
11. Any time the commercial strata accumulate a critical mass of capital or disposable income, they will enter into politics; usually behind surrogate politicians.
12. The legislative and judicial systems follow the governance system in that regard. How they interpret their charges becomes critical to the success of the commercial strata.
13. Enforcement is the next step in the process, determining whether a polity allows pursuit of happiness or leans toward authoritarianism.
14. The root cause of authoritarianism is a minority attempting to rule over a majority.
15. In this instance, the majority can be illiterate; or in the absolute grip of a given doctrine.
16. The authoritarian governance systems can contribute to both enlightenment and to the darkening of minds by its actions.
17. If the totalitarian governance strata is dedicated to perpetuating itself rather than pursuing enlightenment, it will fail sooner.
18. When a governance stratum uses a belief system dogma as the basis of its authoritarianism, the ensuing repercussions are of the worst type.
19. When the authoritarian governance strata follow an original belief system that it tries to ‘enforce,’ it is always a highly modified and adapted form, rather than the most popular version, which captures the imagination of the governance strata.
20. These modifications may or may not be understood by the faithful. As long as the modifications are not understood, the governance strata will benefit from the ignorance.
21. When modifications effected by the governance strata to the prevailing doctrine are understood by the masses, there will be a clamor to return to the ‘origins.’ This will cause instability.
22. Whenever a doctrine collides with reason at large, it is reason that loses at first.
23. The struggle of reason with dogma does not produce a workable hybrid. The result will not make sense unless the entire polity decides to turn deaf and dumb on the subject.
24. Balasagunlu Yusuf was one of the first to understand this struggle; so was Spinoza.
25. Erasmus was working his way out of dogma toward reason. He chose to do it within his profession and belief system. Whereas, Spinoza broke through.
26. Balasagunlu was attempting to bring together two different sets of value systems or to save the more ancient one under that guise despite the onslaught of the newcomer – depending on one’s private preference.
27. Groups or individuals speak and insist on human rights. This assumes that homo sapiens have rights. What makes them think so?
28. The so called rights are only conventions, much like an armistice signed and reluctantly agreed to by the relevant parties.
29. There must be an agreement between the governing strata and the members of the polity that a certain list of actions are to be free from interference.
30. Civil and criminal codes list the types of behavior not acceptable to the polity, as defined by the ‘rights’ agreements, providing remedies and repercussions.
31. That there is a written human rights document is insufficient. The enforcement aspect has to be sorted through.
32. There has always been a contention between the governance strata and the members of the polity as to the boundaries of rights.
33. The outcome is always fought for.
34. If the membership of a polity neglect to participate in their own governance, the governance strata will very happily take over; and may impose greater reductions on human rights
35. The more the members of a polity know about the world of human affairs, the more they will have a stake in their own governance.
36. It is very tempting to advocate a life of happiness for all, in accordance with the writings and arguments to this point.
37. Human motivations and composition of mind is such that, even if a constant state of happiness can be sustained throughout the world, once again unhappiness would descend on homo sapiens.
38. It appears that the chaos explanation of the forces of the universe is also burnt into the very being of its inhabitants. Homo sapiens need to experience the full spectrum of emotions or be aware of the negatives at close quarters before learning to appreciate happiness.
39. What changes is not human nature, but the means by which it is manifested. Technological innovations play a significant role, from killing face-to-face with a blade to killing from long distance with remotely guided weapons large bodies of people never met by the one who directs such weapons.
40. Therefore, the explanations of cyclicalities cannot hold true. It is the continuation in a stand-still format of the struggle of human nature with itself.
41. This will hold true in the future, even with, and despite, the future developments of technology.
42. Technological developments are nothing but an effort to break the impasse of stalemate in the competition between identities.
43. The prefix ‘post’ not only implies that a certain era, fashion or fad is concluded (if indeed the assertion to the subject matter can demonstrably hold), but, by default, also the beginning of yet another. Therefore, the subject becomes a matter within the domain of ‘pre’ as well.
44. In human affairs, especially pertaining to Identity, there is transformation; whether natural evolution or due to external pressures.
45. Identity is either present or not.
46. I was observing a group of early grade school pupils. In their play-time they were engaging in creating the rules of their activities. One suggested that he was the most senior. Another countered that he had been a pupil longest. A third began taking a threatening posture toward the first two. The point of contention was to determine who was going to order the rest of the children about. This formula will persist for the future.
47. A strong belief in the contents of a thoughtful question is better than a memorized answer. In such a case, the quest to answer the thought-out question will eventually lead to better insight.
48. Dogs are known to bark in anagrams.
49. Some individuals are found treading in recycled waters.
The clouds are threatening rain
Bring on Benjamin Franklin.
Hasan Bülent Paksoy is a Turkish historian (b. 1948 in Ödemiş) who earned his doctoral degree at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. He was a Faculty Associate at Harvard University and taught at the Ohio State University, Franklin University, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Central Connecticut State University, Texas Tech University, and Baker College. He is now happily retired.
In addition to authoring numerous original and historical works, Paksoy is the translator of such historical fiction as The Sun is Also Fire, a short story about the struggle of the Turks of Transoxiana to remain independent of the expanding Caliphate in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D.
Text copyright © 2001 H.B. Paksoy
Cover image: Butenko Yulia.
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First Rounded Globe edition, August 2016.
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